SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters within its runtime process. With the obtained SmartLife application authentication parameters, attackers can directly invoke the backend interface /account/verify.serv to determine whether a target email address is registered for a SmartLife account. If the account exists, the real backend account ID can also be retrieved.
PUBLISHED5.2CWE-269
Email enumeration and account ID leakage vulnerabilities in ZTE SmartLife APP
Problem type
Affected products
ZTE
SmartLife
ZTE_SL_V2.8.2_ABROAD and prior versions - AFFECTED
References
GitHub Security Advisories
GHSA-72pp-r64r-349h
SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters...
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-72pp-r64r-349hSmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters within its runtime process. With the obtained SmartLife application authentication parameters, attackers can directly invoke the backend interface /account/verify.serv to determine whether a target email address is registered for a SmartLife account. If the account exists, the real backend account ID can also be retrieved.
JSON source
https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-86554Click to expand
{
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-86554",
"assignerOrgId": "6786b568-6808-4982-b61f-398b0d9679eb",
"assignerShortName": "zte",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-20T09:17:21.674Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-08T02:55:56.712Z",
"datePublished": "2026-09-20T07:55:08.842Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"containers": {
"cna": {
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "6786b568-6808-4982-b61f-398b0d9679eb",
"shortName": "zte",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-20T09:17:21.674Z"
},
"title": "Email enumeration and account ID leakage vulnerabilities in ZTE SmartLife APP",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters within its runtime process. With the obtained SmartLife application authentication parameters, attackers can directly invoke the backend interface /account/verify.serv to determine whether a target email address is registered for a SmartLife account. If the account exists, the real backend account ID can also be retrieved.",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"type": "text/html",
"base64": false,
"value": "<p>SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters within its runtime process. With the obtained SmartLife application authentication parameters, attackers can directly invoke the backend interface /account/verify.serv to determine whether a target email address is registered for a SmartLife account. If the account exists, the real backend account ID can also be retrieved.</p>"
}
]
}
],
"affected": [
{
"vendor": "ZTE",
"product": "SmartLife",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"versions": [
{
"version": "ZTE_SL_V2.8.2_ABROAD and prior versions",
"status": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"description": "# CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management",
"cweId": "CWE-269",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://support.zte.com.cn/zte-iccp-isupport-webui/bulletin/detail/2171542593031840113"
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-115",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-115 Authentication Bypass"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
],
"cvssV3_1": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 4.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM"
}
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Mina Nageh Salama Zekry",
"type": "finder"
}
]
}
}
}