Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.
AshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.
This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-82725",
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-31T03:09:25.850Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-31T00:59:08.960Z",
"datePublished": "2026-08-31T03:09:25.850Z",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-31T03:09:25.850Z"
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"title": "AshPhoenix FilterForm allows filtering across non-public relationships, disclosing private related data",
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"value": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.\n\nAshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.\n\nThis issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.",
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"value": "<p>Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.</p>\n<p><code>AshPhoenix.FilterForm</code> resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied <code>path</code> with <code>Ash.Resource.Info.related/2</code>, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. <code>parse_path_and_field/2</code> also rewrote a <code>field</code> naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so <code>field=some_private_rel</code> was accepted too. Both <code>path</code> and <code>field</code> come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to <code>Ash.Query.do_filter/2</code> without the public-only enforcement of <code>Ash.Filter.parse_input/2</code>. The fix resolves each hop with <code>Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2</code>, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.</p>\n<p>This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.</p>"
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"value": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.\n\n`AshPhoenix.FilterForm` resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied `path` with `Ash.Resource.Info.related/2`, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. `parse_path_and_field/2` also rewrote a `field` naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so `field=some_private_rel` was accepted too. Both `path` and `field` come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to `Ash.Query.do_filter/2` without the public-only enforcement of `Ash.Filter.parse_input/2`. The fix resolves each hop with `Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2`, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.\n\nThis issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25."
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"affected": [
{
"vendor": "ash-project",
"product": "ash_phoenix",
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"packageName": "ash_phoenix",
"cpes": [
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"versionType": "semver",
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"product": "ash_phoenix",
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"packageName": "ash-project/ash_phoenix",
"cpes": [
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"modules": [
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"programFiles": [
"lib/ash_phoenix/filter_form/filter_form.ex"
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"repo": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix",
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"version": "06875682999938f607c970e71b6a80af90e18b3d",
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"description": "CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
"cweId": "CWE-639",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
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"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/security/advisories/GHSA-7xhg-xphm-f458",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/commit/a3691a3cb0947e8f2dc2c3cbff138a3e6197a15b",
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"impacts": [
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"capecId": "CAPEC-77",
"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables"
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"value": "The resource exposes an AshPhoenix.FilterForm whose params the attacker controls, and has a non-public relationship to data that should not be filterable.",
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"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "Peter Ullrich",
"type": "finder"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Peter Ullrich",
"type": "reporter"
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{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Zach Daniel / Ash Project",
"type": "remediation developer"
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"value": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF",
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