MISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an incorrectly formatted HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect:
Redirect permanent / https://misp.example
Apache’s Redirect directive appends any portion of the requested path that follows the matched prefix to the configured destination URL. Because the destination did not end with /, attacker-controlled path content was appended directly to the hostname rather than to its URL path.
For example, a request resembling:
http://misp.example/@attacker.example/
could result in a redirect resembling:
https://misp.example@attacker.example/
Under standard URL parsing, misp.example is interpreted as user information and attacker.example as the destination host. An unauthenticated remote attacker could therefore construct a URL hosted under the legitimate MISP domain that redirects users to an attacker-controlled website.
The vulnerability could be used for phishing, credential collection, or potentially disclosing sensitive query-string information preserved during the redirect. Exploitation requires a user to follow the crafted HTTP URL.
The fix adds the missing trailing slash to the redirect destination, ensuring that appended request data remains part of the path on the configured MISP host.
Existing installationsExisting MISP installations should review their Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration and ensure that the HTTPS redirect destination ends with a trailing slash:
Redirect permanent / https://misp.example/
After updating the configuration, validate it with apachectl configtest and reload or restart Apache for the change to take effect
GHSA-frjf-677q-65jf
MISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an...
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-frjf-677q-65jfMISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an incorrectly formatted HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect:
Redirect permanent / https://misp.example
Apache’s Redirect directive appends any portion of the requested path that follows the matched prefix to the configured destination URL. Because the destination did not end with /, attacker-controlled path content was appended directly to the hostname rather than to its URL path.
For example, a request resembling:
http://misp.example/@attacker.example/
could result in a redirect resembling:
https://misp.example@attacker.example/
Under standard URL parsing, misp.example is interpreted as user information and attacker.example as the destination host. An unauthenticated remote attacker could therefore construct a URL hosted under the legitimate MISP domain that redirects users to an attacker-controlled website.
The vulnerability could be used for phishing, credential collection, or potentially disclosing sensitive query-string information preserved during the redirect. Exploitation requires a user to follow the crafted HTTP URL.
The fix adds the missing trailing slash to the redirect destination, ensuring that appended request data remains part of the path on the configured MISP host.
Existing installationsExisting MISP installations should review their Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration and ensure that the HTTPS redirect destination ends with a trailing slash:
Redirect permanent / https://misp.example/
After updating the configuration, validate it with apachectl configtest and reload or restart Apache for the change to take effect
Click to expand
{
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-67178",
"assignerOrgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-28T14:30:22.103Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-28T14:30:17.943Z",
"datePublished": "2026-07-28T14:30:22.103Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"containers": {
"cna": {
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"shortName": "CIRCL",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-28T14:30:22.103Z"
},
"title": "Open Redirect in MISP Installer-Generated Apache Configuration",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "MISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an incorrectly formatted HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect:\n\nRedirect permanent / https://misp.example\n\nApache’s Redirect directive appends any portion of the requested path that follows the matched prefix to the configured destination URL. Because the destination did not end with /, attacker-controlled path content was appended directly to the hostname rather than to its URL path.\n\nFor example, a request resembling:\n\nhttp://misp.example/@attacker.example/\n\ncould result in a redirect resembling:\n\nhttps://misp.example@attacker.example/\n\nUnder standard URL parsing, misp.example is interpreted as user information and attacker.example as the destination host. An unauthenticated remote attacker could therefore construct a URL hosted under the legitimate MISP domain that redirects users to an attacker-controlled website.\n\nThe vulnerability could be used for phishing, credential collection, or potentially disclosing sensitive query-string information preserved during the redirect. Exploitation requires a user to follow the crafted HTTP URL.\n\nThe fix adds the missing trailing slash to the redirect destination, ensuring that appended request data remains part of the path on the configured MISP host.\n\n\n\nExisting installationsExisting MISP installations should review their Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration and ensure that the HTTPS redirect destination ends with a trailing slash:\n\nRedirect permanent / https://misp.example/\n\nAfter updating the configuration, validate it with apachectl configtest and reload or restart Apache for the change to take effect",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"type": "text/html",
"base64": false,
"value": "<p>MISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an incorrectly formatted HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect:</p><pre><code>Redirect permanent / https://misp.example</code></pre><p>Apache’s <code>Redirect</code> directive appends any portion of the requested path that follows the matched prefix to the configured destination URL. Because the destination did not end with <code>/</code>, attacker-controlled path content was appended directly to the hostname rather than to its URL path.</p><p>For example, a request resembling:</p><pre><code>http://misp.example/@attacker.example/</code></pre><p>could result in a redirect resembling:</p><pre><code>https://misp.example@attacker.example/</code></pre><p>Under standard URL parsing, <code>misp.example</code> is interpreted as user information and <code>attacker.example</code> as the destination host. An unauthenticated remote attacker could therefore construct a URL hosted under the legitimate MISP domain that redirects users to an attacker-controlled website.</p><p>The vulnerability could be used for phishing, credential collection, or potentially disclosing sensitive query-string information preserved during the redirect. Exploitation requires a user to follow the crafted HTTP URL.</p><p>The fix adds the missing trailing slash to the redirect destination, ensuring that appended request data remains part of the path on the configured MISP host.<br><br></p><h3>Existing installations</h3><p>Existing MISP installations should review their Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration and ensure that the HTTPS redirect destination ends with a trailing slash:</p><pre><code>Redirect permanent / https://misp.example/</code></pre><p>After updating the configuration, validate it with <code>apachectl configtest</code> and reload or restart Apache for the change to take effect</p><p></p><br>"
}
]
}
],
"affected": [
{
"vendor": "misp",
"product": "misp",
"repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"versions": [
{
"version": "0",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThan": "2.5.41"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"description": "CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')",
"cweId": "CWE-601",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/15becd3b21245ddc6a8b5dad46e983ade405ddf8",
"tags": [
"patch"
]
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-33",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-33 HTTP Request Smuggling"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
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}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Jeroen Pinoy",
"type": "finder"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Jeroen Pinoy",
"type": "remediation developer"
}
]
}
}
}