Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports "imageInput": "$userInput.body.imageUrl", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright.
Heym before 0.0.91 SSRF via image fetching and IPv6 validation
Problem type
Affected products
heymrun
< 0.0.91 - AFFECTED
0.0.91 - UNAFFECTED
References
https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.91-ssrf-via-image-fetching-and-ipv6-validation
GitHub Security Advisories
GHSA-j62x-q9gf-62p4
Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both...
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j62x-q9gf-62p4Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports "imageInput": "$userInput.body.imageUrl", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright.
https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100863
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.91-ssrf-via-image-fetching-and-ipv6-validation
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j62x-q9gf-62p4
JSON source
https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-100863Click to expand
{
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"assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
"assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-27T01:28:52.561Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-27T00:20:54.407Z",
"datePublished": "2026-09-27T01:28:52.561Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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"containers": {
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"dateUpdated": "2026-09-27T01:28:52.561Z"
},
"datePublic": "2026-08-15T00:00:00.000Z",
"title": "Heym before 0.0.91 SSRF via image fetching and IPv6 validation",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports \"imageInput\": \"$userInput.body.imageUrl\", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright."
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"affected": [
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"cweId": "CWE-918",
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"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4",
"name": "GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4)",
"tags": [
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},
{
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.91-ssrf-via-image-fetching-and-ipv6-validation",
"name": "VulnCheck Advisory: Heym before 0.0.91 SSRF via image fetching and IPv6 validation",
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"metrics": [
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"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM"
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}
}
}