2026-09-27 1:28CVE-2026-100863VulnCheck
PUBLISHED5.2CWE-918

Heym before 0.0.91 SSRF via image fetching and IPv6 validation

Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports "imageInput": "$userInput.body.imageUrl", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright.

Problem type

Affected products

heymrun

heym

< 0.0.91 - AFFECTED

0.0.91 - UNAFFECTED

References

GitHub Security Advisories

GHSA-j62x-q9gf-62p4

Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both...

https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j62x-q9gf-62p4

Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports "imageInput": "$userInput.body.imageUrl", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright.

JSON source

https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-100863
Click to expand
{
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "cveMetadata": {
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-100863",
    "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
    "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-27T01:28:52.561Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-27T00:20:54.407Z",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-27T01:28:52.561Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "providerMetadata": {
        "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
        "shortName": "VulnCheck",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-27T01:28:52.561Z"
      },
      "datePublic": "2026-08-15T00:00:00.000Z",
      "title": "Heym before 0.0.91 SSRF via image fetching and IPv6 validation",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports \"imageInput\": \"$userInput.body.imageUrl\", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright."
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "vendor": "heymrun",
          "product": "heym",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "0",
              "status": "affected",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThan": "0.0.91"
            },
            {
              "version": "0.0.91",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "description": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4",
          "name": "GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4)",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ]
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.91-ssrf-via-image-fetching-and-ipv6-validation",
          "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: Heym before 0.0.91 SSRF via image fetching and IPv6 validation",
          "tags": [
            "third-party-advisory"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "format": "CVSS"
        },
        {
          "format": "CVSS",
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "version": "3.1",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}