Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., "CONNECT trusted.example:443") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to "/", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.
Netty HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form mistranslated to malformed HTTP/3
Problem type
Affected products
netty
< 4.2.18.Final - AFFECTED
4.2.18.Final - UNAFFECTED
References
https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-jgph-cgq3-c627
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/netty-http-1-connect-authority-form-mistranslated-to-malformed-http-3
GitHub Security Advisories
GHSA-qmrm-mg2w-2mpw
Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not...
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qmrm-mg2w-2mpwNetty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., "CONNECT trusted.example:443") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to "/", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.
https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-jgph-cgq3-c627
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100663
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/netty-http-1-connect-authority-form-mistranslated-to-malformed-http-3
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qmrm-mg2w-2mpw
JSON source
https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-100663Click to expand
{
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-100663",
"assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
"assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-26T13:23:29.751Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-26T02:33:59.039Z",
"datePublished": "2026-09-26T13:23:29.751Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"containers": {
"cna": {
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
"shortName": "VulnCheck",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-26T13:23:29.751Z"
},
"datePublic": "2026-09-10T00:00:00.000Z",
"title": "Netty HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form mistranslated to malformed HTTP/3",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., \"CONNECT trusted.example:443\") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to \"/\", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"vendor": "netty",
"product": "netty",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"versions": [
{
"version": "4.2.2.Final",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThan": "4.2.18.Final"
},
{
"version": "4.2.18.Final",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"description": "Improper Input Validation",
"cweId": "CWE-20",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-jgph-cgq3-c627",
"name": "GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-jgph-cgq3-c627)",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
]
},
{
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/netty-http-1-connect-authority-form-mistranslated-to-malformed-http-3",
"name": "VulnCheck Advisory: Netty HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form mistranslated to malformed HTTP/3",
"tags": [
"third-party-advisory"
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"format": "CVSS"
},
{
"format": "CVSS",
"cvssV3_1": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH"
}
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "rexpository",
"type": "reporter"
}
]
}
}
}