vLLM through 0.29.0 fetches and fully materializes remote or inline media before enforcing its documented media controls (the VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB compressed-audio size cap, default 25 MB, and the per-modality --limit-mm-per-prompt item limits). Across four ingress paths — the shared media-acquisition layer (HTTPConnection.get_bytes()/async_get_bytes()), the chat completions audio_url/base64 path, the batch speech runner, and the Rust frontend POST /tokenize route — the server reads the entire HTTP response body, base64-decodes the inline payload, or spawns one fetch/decode task per media part, and only then applies the limit (or, on some paths, never applies it). A remote attacker can therefore cause the API server or batch-runner process to allocate memory and consume outbound bandwidth proportional to an attacker-chosen body size or media item count before the request is rejected, resulting in pre-inference memory and bandwidth exhaustion (denial of service). The chat and batch surfaces require an API key when one is configured; the Rust frontend /tokenize route is unauthenticated by design. There is no code execution or data disclosure impact.
vLLM before 0.29.0 Resource Exhaustion via Unbounded Media Materialization
Problem type
Affected products
vllm-project
< 0.29.0 - AFFECTED
0.29.0 - UNAFFECTED
References
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-p6g9-7v3x-m8mv
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-before-0.29.0-resource-exhaustion-via-unbounded-media-materialization
GitHub Security Advisories
GHSA-j8gm-f3cq-6c27
vLLM through 0.29.0 fetches and fully materializes remote or inline media before enforcing its...
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j8gm-f3cq-6c27vLLM through 0.29.0 fetches and fully materializes remote or inline media before enforcing its documented media controls (the VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB compressed-audio size cap, default 25 MB, and the per-modality --limit-mm-per-prompt item limits). Across four ingress paths — the shared media-acquisition layer (HTTPConnection.get_bytes()/async_get_bytes()), the chat completions audio_url/base64 path, the batch speech runner, and the Rust frontend POST /tokenize route — the server reads the entire HTTP response body, base64-decodes the inline payload, or spawns one fetch/decode task per media part, and only then applies the limit (or, on some paths, never applies it). A remote attacker can therefore cause the API server or batch-runner process to allocate memory and consume outbound bandwidth proportional to an attacker-chosen body size or media item count before the request is rejected, resulting in pre-inference memory and bandwidth exhaustion (denial of service). The chat and batch surfaces require an API key when one is configured; the Rust frontend /tokenize route is unauthenticated by design. There is no code execution or data disclosure impact.
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-p6g9-7v3x-m8mv
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100650
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-before-0.29.0-resource-exhaustion-via-unbounded-media-materialization
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j8gm-f3cq-6c27
JSON source
https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-100650Click to expand
{
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-100650",
"assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
"assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-26T13:23:20.418Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-26T02:33:07.898Z",
"datePublished": "2026-09-26T13:23:20.418Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"containers": {
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"shortName": "VulnCheck",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-26T13:23:20.418Z"
},
"datePublic": "2026-09-12T00:00:00.000Z",
"title": "vLLM before 0.29.0 Resource Exhaustion via Unbounded Media Materialization",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "vLLM through 0.29.0 fetches and fully materializes remote or inline media before enforcing its documented media controls (the VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB compressed-audio size cap, default 25 MB, and the per-modality --limit-mm-per-prompt item limits). Across four ingress paths — the shared media-acquisition layer (HTTPConnection.get_bytes()/async_get_bytes()), the chat completions audio_url/base64 path, the batch speech runner, and the Rust frontend POST /tokenize route — the server reads the entire HTTP response body, base64-decodes the inline payload, or spawns one fetch/decode task per media part, and only then applies the limit (or, on some paths, never applies it). A remote attacker can therefore cause the API server or batch-runner process to allocate memory and consume outbound bandwidth proportional to an attacker-chosen body size or media item count before the request is rejected, resulting in pre-inference memory and bandwidth exhaustion (denial of service). The chat and batch surfaces require an API key when one is configured; the Rust frontend /tokenize route is unauthenticated by design. There is no code execution or data disclosure impact."
}
],
"affected": [
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"product": "vllm",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"versions": [
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"version": "0",
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"versionType": "semver",
"lessThan": "0.29.0"
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"problemTypes": [
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"description": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption",
"cweId": "CWE-400",
"type": "CWE"
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"references": [
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"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-p6g9-7v3x-m8mv",
"name": "GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-p6g9-7v3x-m8mv)",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
]
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34",
"name": "Patch Commit",
"tags": [
"patch"
]
},
{
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-before-0.29.0-resource-exhaustion-via-unbounded-media-materialization",
"name": "VulnCheck Advisory: vLLM before 0.29.0 Resource Exhaustion via Unbounded Media Materialization",
"tags": [
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"metrics": [
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},
{
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"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM"
}
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "KernelClint",
"type": "finder"
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{
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"value": "jperezdealgaba",
"type": "coordinator"
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]
}
}
}